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Abstract: When establishing whether a disputed regulation is protectionist under
the WTO National Treatment Principle, there are two key elements: its effect on
the market for competitive products, and its intent or policy rationale. Yet the
Appellate Body has formally rejected both elements, and in the surprising 2014
outcome of EC–Seal Products, under the key provision GATT Article III(4), the
latter was simply denied. This obfuscation leads to implicit and explicit conﬂation
of these elements. In some disputes, qualitative ﬁndings about the existence and
nature of competitive relationships are presented using the language of
quantitative market analysis. In others, compelling policy objectives shape the
outcome of a supposedly market-based analysis. This article proposes an
approach that synthesizes two strands of scholarship, advocating more rigorous
use of market-based evidence and stronger analysis of policy rationale. Separating
these elements will achieve the appropriate balance between them and lead to
greater transparency in dispute outcomes.
1. Introduction
Proposing a three-step approach to the National Treatment Principle
Applying the WTO National Treatment Principle raises the difﬁcult question of
how to deﬁne and establish protectionism. The National Treatment Principle pro-
vides for equality of treatment between ‘like’ imported and domestic products and
services. But what does equality of treatment mean? If a regulation has a negative
competitive impact on imported products, is this enough to establish a breach? Or
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is it necessary to consider additionally whether the regulation has a non-protection-
ist purpose, which accounts for this negative impact?
This is one of the most debated issues in WTO case law. National treatment is a
foundational principle of WTO law and the focus of much judicial activity. Because
it ‘polices’ domestic regulation applied inside the border, it is of key importance to
striking the balance between enabling governments to regulate and bringing into
being trade liberalization commitments, an issue which is sensitive and controver-
sial. Furthermore it covers not only de jure discrimination (from laws that explicitly
distinguish between domestic and imported products), but also de facto discrimin-
ation (discrimination ‘in fact’ from origin-neutral laws). In both cases, and particu-
larly the latter, the discrimination analysis normally goes far beyond the letter of the
law. In other words, a regulation’s text is not likely to reveal whether it has been
written and applied in good faith vis-à-vis the National Treatment Principle.
Adjudication requires the Appellate Body to analyse and interpret various context-
ual factors.
As early GATT Panels recognized, when establishing whether a disputed regula-
tion is protectionist, there are two key elements: its intent, or policy rationale, and
its effect on the market for competitive products. Both can be challenging to ascer-
tain. Protectionist intent may be deliberately concealed, or at least not formally
declared. Establishing protectionist effect necessitates complex causal analysis.
For these and other reasons, the Appellate Body has formally rejected both intent
and effect as a basis for establishing the existence of protectionism. Yet the analyt-
ical tests that it has adopted reﬂect the same inescapable factors: (policy-based)
intent and (market-based) effect. This obfuscation at the core of the analysis
creates an incentive to utilize discretionary ‘smell test’ (Hudec, 1998) approaches
that conﬂate market-based and policy-based reasoning. This can take the form of
ﬁndings about the existence and nature of competitive relationships that rest
upon what appear to be quantitative market analysis, even after the Appellate
Body has rejected (or misinterpreted) evidence submitted, leading to a loss of trans-
parency and rigour. It can also lead to a compelling policy objective inﬂuencing the
application of a supposedly ‘market-based’ analysis.
Adding to the complexity, the Appellate Body has emphasized minor differences
in thewording between key subparagraphs ofArticle III and the TBTAgreement and
undertakesQ2 a discrepant approach to all three, and the EC–Seal Products ruling
under Article III(4) increases this textual hair-splitting (Davey and Maskus, 2013:
181).1 Legal and institutional challenges arise from the current divergent jurispru-
dence. To respond to these problems, this article proposes more convergence
between these National Treatment Principle provisions: a rigorous market-based
1 As summarized by Davey and Maskus (2013), ‘there are potential inconsistencies between [the
Appellate Body’s] jurisprudence under GATT Article III:4 and its jurisprudence under GATT Article
III:2, second sentence, and TBT Article 2.1. Eventually, some reconciliation will be required.’ See also
WTO (2014a).












































effects analysis, followed by a policy-based intent analysis. This takes the form of a
three-step approach. The ﬁrst two steps are the same as those the Appellate Body has
afﬁrmed in EC–Seal Products: discerning whether the products in dispute are in a
competitive relationship, and whether there is an impact on the conditions of com-
petition to the detriment of the imported product. There should then however be a
third step of considering whether the detrimental impact can be explained based
upon a non-protectionist regulatory rationale. While the proposed reforms are
based in a lengthy tradition of scholarship, the article suggests a novel way of separ-
ating and integrating economic and policy-based components of the analysis.
The ﬁrst and second steps: strengthening the ‘disparate impact’ analysis
To a surprising degree, the Appellate Body and the Panel have rejected a reliance on
quantitatively derived thresholds or benchmarks to establish the existence and
nature of competitive relationships between products. At the same time, they
have often utilized the concepts and language of relevant econometric approaches
to support qualitative conclusions.
A clearer picture of what the market suggests about the existence and nature of
competitive relationships would improve the quality of dispute outcomes. The ef-
fective implementation of this suggestion, echoed in recent scholarship (Diebold,
2014; Pauwelyn, 2013; Bown, 2010), would require reforms from the Parties’
initial submissions to the Panel’s ﬁndings of fact to the Appellate Body’s ﬁnal deci-
sion. A stronger afﬁrmation from the Appellate Body that economic evidence
informs dispute outcomes would help motivate these changes.
In practice, the rejection of market evidence may also contribute to an interpret-
ive bias toward ﬁnding a disparate impact. This is implicit in its justiﬁcations: ﬁrst,
the regulation in dispute distorts competition, and econometric approaches may
not capture this. Second, relying on assessments of trade ﬂows will not capture dis-
criminatory regulation whose impacts on imports are not clearly evidenced.2 These
problems are non-trivial, but the cure of conﬂating quantitative and qualitative rea-
soning does not ﬁt the disease, but makes it worse by relying on a speculative ap-
proach that purports to be ‘objective’. As stated by Van Aaken in this context:
‘Being shortsighted is usually better than being blind’ (Van Aaken, 2011: 43).
The third step: considering the policy rationale
In spring 2014, the Appellate Body in EC–Seal Products afﬁrmed that under the
GATT National Treatment Principle, Article III(4), a negative competitive impact
on imported products equates to a violation. This has been usefully termed a ‘dis-
parate impact’ approach (Regan, 2004: 756)Q3 . Disparate impact should not be an
automatic grounds for a violation, as this gives Article III(4) too much inﬂuence
2 See Section 3 below.












































over national regulation. As has been argued by many commentators over a
number of years, it is essential to consider the reason (Hudec, 1998; Regan,
2004Q3 ; Reid, 2010). Considering competitive impacts to be decisive risks tarring un-
related market circumstancesQ4 with the brush of protectionism.
The Appellate Body may still consider the reason for the regulation, and whether
it can justify the disparate impact, under the General Exception to the GATT,
Article XX. However, the list of designated exceptions under Article XX does
not exhaust all of the possibilities that justify intervention. Furthermore, consider-
ing the purpose of a disputed regulation should comprise an integral component of
the non-discrimination analysis. As Article XX is an exception, it cannot fulﬁll this
function.
EC–Seal Products also threatens the proper functioning of WTO provisions. It
imbalances the GATT Article III(4) and the analogous National Treatment
Principle in the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (‘TBT Agreement’).
TBT Article 2.1 begins by establishing a disparate impact but additionally considers
if it is based on a legitimate regulatory distinction (Flett, 2013; Mavroidis, 2013).
There is some overlap in the provisions, and the discrepancy is leading countries to
avoid complaints under TBT Article 2.1, because it is perceived as an easier test to
pass.3 The outcome is to marginalize the TBT Agreement, a more recently nego-
tiated provision whose legal test better reﬂects the purpose of the National
Treatment Principle.
This article thus takes stock of developments under Article III(4) post-EC–Seal
Products. It proposes an approach which addresses some of the latter’s negative
implications, and which ﬁts within the constraints of the provisions as drafted.
Under the proposed approach, both market-based and policy-based components
of the Article III analysis are strengthened and made distinct.
2. The National Treatment Principle in GATT Article III and the TBT Agreement
The key provisions of GATT Article III are Article III(2) and III(4), which cover
trade-restrictive taxation and regulation, respectively. This article focuses primarily
on the former, while taking into account the Article in its totality and the interpretive
differences between these two subparagraphs, which support a reformed interpret-
ation of Article III(4). Both subparagraphs focus on internal measures and whether
they favour domestic products, and both are interpreted with reference to the same
chapeau. Article III(1), the chapeau, states that measures should not be applied to
imported or domestic products ‘so as to afford protection to domestic production’.4
3 See Section 4 below.
4 ‘The Members recognize that internal taxes and other internal charges, and laws, regulations, and
requirements affecting the internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use of
products, and internal quantitative regulations requiring the mixture, processing or use of products in
speciﬁed amounts or proportions, should not be applied to imported or domestic products so as to












































The ﬁrst sentence of Article III(2), on taxation, stipulates that a government must
not tax ‘like’ imported products ‘in excess of’ domestic products. The second sen-
tence stipulates that if the products are not ‘like’, but directly competitive, differen-
tial taxation is also in violation if it results in the protection of domestic products.5
Under Article III(4), on regulation, the key questions are whether the products in
dispute are ‘like’, and if so whether the imported product is treated no less favour-
ably than the domestic product.6
The TBT Agreement deals with technical regulations, standards, and conformity
assessment. Due to the overlap in their jurisdictions, there may be initial uncer-
tainty with respect to which WTO provision, Article III(4) or the TBT
Agreement, is most relevant to a measure in dispute. Because the deﬁnition of ‘tech-
nical regulation’ is selective, it had not been the focus of many disputes until the
quick succession of three TBT Agreement disputes in 2011‒2012. TBT Article
2.1 contains a national treatment provision, whose wording is similar to that of
Article III(4).7 Yet its interpretation has differed. The key questions are the same
as under Article III(4): ﬁrst, establishing whether domestic and imported products
are ‘like’, and, second, if the imported product is receiving treatment ‘no less fa-
vourable’ than that accorded to the domestic product. However, when establishing
the presence of ‘less favourable treatment’, the Appellate Body has taken into
account the purpose of the regulation in dispute by considering whether it is
based upon a ‘legitimate regulatory distinction’. These differences and their impli-
cations are further discussed below.
afford protection to domestic production’ (Article III(1) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) 1994).
5 ‘The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other con-
tracting party shall not be subject, directly or indirectly, to internal taxes or other internal charges of any
kind in excess of those applied, directly or indirectly, to like domestic products. Moreover, no contracting
party shall otherwise apply internal taxes or other internal charges to imported or domestic products in a
manner contrary to the principles set forth in paragraph 1.’
The second sentence has an interpretive note, which reads:
‘A tax conforming to the requirements of the ﬁrst sentence of paragraph 2 would be considered to be in-
consistent with the provisions of the second sentence only in cases where competition was involved
between, on the one hand, the taxed product, and, on the other hand, a directly competitive or substitutable
product which was not similarly taxed’ (ibid. at Article III(2)).
6 ‘The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other con-
tracting party shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like products of national
origin in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, pur-
chase, transportation, distribution or use. The provisions of this paragraph shall not prevent the applica-
tion of differential internal transportation charges which are based exclusively on the economic operation
of the means of transport and not on the nationality of the product’ (ibid. at Article III(4)).
7 ‘Members shall ensure that in respect of technical regulations, products imported from the territory of
anyMember shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like products of national
origin and to like products originating in any other country’ (Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade
(TBT Agreement), 1994).












































3. Assessing competitive relationships under the National Treatment Principle
Davey and Maskus linked the narrower approach that the Appellate Body has
taken to Article III (in contrast with TBT Article 2.1) with the need for sounder eco-
nomic analysis of the impact of the regulation in dispute on the market. After the
2011–2012 TBT disputes, they wrote: ‘If the Appellate Body is unwilling to
import the “so as to afford protection” test in to the less favourable treatment ana-
lysis under Article III:4, perhaps it will … require a more rigorous showing of a
modiﬁcation of conditions of competition in de facto discrimination cases’
(Davey and Maskus, 2013: 181). In other words, if it is going to base ﬁndings of
discrimination on conditions of competition, the Appellate Body should be sure
that at least it has understood these conditions correctly.
Greater evidentiary rigour can complement, rather than replace, an approach to
Article III that incorporates both ‘effect’ and ‘intent’ (the latter discussed in the
second part of this article). There are a number of examples in case law under
Article III and TBT Article 2.1 where more use of market analysis would have
led to sounder dispute outcomes. A body of literature from those better qualiﬁed
than this author, cited throughout, considers how to make better use of economic
methodologies. The following critique is far from comprehensive, but highlights the
disconnection between the market evidence submitted and the legal conclusions it
supports. Like the ambiguous treatment of regulatory ‘intent’, it is symptomatic of
ambivalence toward fundamental elements that inform the analysis of whether a
measure is protectionist. It leads to lack of transparency and the undesirable conﬂ-
ation of quantitative and qualitative analysis. As the Panel is responsible for
ﬁndings of fact, including evaluating such evidence, much of the following
focuses on Panel decisions.
Like and directly competitive or substitutable products
Under the National Treatment Principle, ‘like’ products are competitive products.
More speciﬁcally, in EC–Asbestos, the Appellate Body afﬁrmed that ‘a determin-
ation of “likeness” under Article III:4 is, fundamentally, a determination about
the nature and extent of a competitive relationship between and among products’,
and8 the TBT disputes have adopted this interpretation;9 EC–Seal Products has
maintained the status quo in this respect.10 Article III(2) contains the additional cat-
8WTO (2001), para. 99.
9 The Panel in the TBT dispute US–Tuna II directly quoted the Appellate Body’s precedent in EC–
Asbestos, above, concluding: ‘Although this statement was made in the context of Article III:4 of the
GATT 1994, we ﬁnd it pertinent also to an interpretation of the terms “like products” in Article 2.1 of
the TBT Agreement’ (WTO, 2012a: paras. 110–111).
10WTO (2014c)Q5 , Panel Report, pp. 48–49.












































egory of ‘directly competitive or substitutable’ products; the importance of compe-
tition to this category is self-evident.11
This might suggest that the dispute settlement bodies currently adopt a quantita-
tive approach, evaluating the market evidence to determine whether products are
like (i.e. competitive). There are standard econometric approaches to quantifying
competitive relationships between goods. These include evaluating the cross-price
elasticity, which aids in establishing whether a change in the price of one product
affects another product; in other words, do consumers consider the products as
substitutes and purchase product B instead of product A if the price of product
A rises.
However, the Appellate Body has repeatedly afﬁrmed in both GATT and TBT
disputes that decisions should not rest upon such evidence. Instead, when establish-
ing whether products are ‘like’, it relies primarily on qualitative criteria drawn from
the 1970 GATT Border Tax Adjustment Working Party report (‘BTA criteria’).
These include: ‘the product’s end-uses in a given market; consumers’ tastes and
habits, which change from country to country; the product’s properties, nature
and quality’.12 The BTA criteria are meant to deﬁne what ‘like’ means, and
product competitiveness is an essential component of ‘likeness’. The Appellate
Body has stated that BTA criteria constitute a non-exhaustive list of criteria for
assessing evidence relating to whether the products in dispute are in a competitive
relationship.13 In this enquiry, the degree to which cross-price elasticity studies
feature varies greatly.
Following from Japan–Alcohol, ‘like’ products are also often described as an ac-
cordion which stretches or narrows depending on the circumstances of the
dispute.14 The statements above both enshrine product competitiveness as decisive
and then emphasize the need for ﬂexibility and qualitative analysis.
As stated by Neven and Trachtman:
the set of factors examined in traditional Article III product comparisons seems
less sophisticated, less precise, and less plausible than a modern economic analysis
of the extent of competition between two products. (Neven and Trachtman,
2013: 302)
11 This has been afﬁrmed in the disputes; for example in Korea–Alcoholic Beverages, the Appellate
Body stated that: ‘It is evident from the wording of the term that the essence of that relationship is that
the products are in competition. This much is clear both from the word “competitive” which means “char-
acterized by competition”, and from the word “substitutable”whichmeans “able to be substituted”’ (WTO,
2003)Q6 .
12 In a later Article III dispute, the Panel amended the list to include the customs classiﬁcation, or HS
Code, of the product.
13WTO (2011b), para 131.
14WTO (1996), at 21Q7 .












































The alcoholic beverage disputes: the rejection of market evidence
The Appellate Body set out its ambivalent stance toward economic evidence, also
evident under Article III(4) and TBT Article 2.1, in several Article III(2) disputes
on taxation of alcoholic beverages. In the early WTO dispute Japan–Alcoholic
Beverages II, cross-price elasticity analyses were central to the Party’s submissions
about whether shochu is directly competitive and substitutable with imported
liquors. Japan argued that consumers would not necessarily switch to shochu in
the absence of spirits.15 The Panel dismissed Japan’s studies on two grounds.
First, it was concerned that these models might not take into account the impact
of the measure in dispute, namely higher tax levels on whiskey, on the competitive-
ness of the products. Second, it criticized Japan’s study because it suffered from the
problems of autocorrelation and multicollinearity.16 The Panel afﬁrmed that,
despite these limitations, Japan’s studies did indeed show some competitive rela-
tionship. Because 10% of consumers would switch to spirits if shochu was not
available, this was sufﬁcient to prove that the spirits were ‘directly competitive
or substitutable’.17
While the Panel critiqued Japan’s methodology, its determination seems random.
The uncertainty that the Panel rejected is smaller than the uncertainty that it
embraced in coming to its own conclusion. Also, by utilizing the language and con-
cepts of cross-price elasticity, the Panel gave the impression that its conclusion was
based upon the rejected studies. In accepting the Panel’s analysis, the Appellate
Body furthered this misperception:
the decisive criterion in order to determine whether two products are directly
competitive or substitutable is whether they have common end-uses, inter alia,
as shown by elasticity of substitution [emphasis added].18
Likely in response to this problem, in the later Korea–Alcoholic Beverages, the
Appellate Body de-emphasized cross-price elasticity:
‘[Q]uantitative analyses, while helpful, should not be considered necessary’ [foot-
note eliminated]. Similarly, ‘quantitative studies of cross-price elasticity are rele-
vant, but not exclusive or even decisive in nature’.19
It further clariﬁed that: ‘We believe that the Panel uses the term “nature of compe-
tition” as a synonym for quality of competition, as opposed to quantity of compe-
tition.’20 It rejected quantity for quality. In Philippines–Distilled Spirits, the
15 Ibid., at para. 4.54.
16 Ibid., at para. 6.31.
17 Ibid., at paras. 6.29–31.
18 Ibid., at para. 6.22.
19WTO (1999a), para. 109.
20 Ibid., at para. 133.












































Appellate Body reiterated this conclusion,21 and the Panel exhibited a similar re-
sponse to submitted economic studies, heavily critiquing the methodology
employed on grounds that were somewhat spurious (Neven and Trachtman,
2013: 319–321).
In both disputes, the conceptual basis for rejecting a quantitative approach was
that the regulation in dispute distorted competition. In other words, the tax made
imported products more expensive, and as a result consumers were less likely to see
them as substitutes for domestic products. Thus, competition should have existed,
though it could not be evidenced.22
This is a serious problem, though it can be accommodated to some extent in
cross-price elasticity studies by making sure that the price differentials that the
tax imposes are accounted for in surveys or by looking to comparable markets
(Neven and Trachtman, 2013: 314). However, the Appellate Body’s response
has been to undertake qualitative analysis of ‘potential’ competition. The
Appellate Body in Korea–Alcoholic Beverages stated:
the scope of the term ‘directly competitive or substitutable’ cannot be limited to
situations where consumers already regard products as alternatives. If reliance
could be placed only on current instances of substitution, the object and
purpose of Article III:2 could be defeated by the protective taxation that the pro-
vision aims to prohibit… In this case, the Panel committed no error of law in but-
tressing its ﬁnding of ‘present direct competition’ by referring to a ‘strong
potentially direct competitive relationship’.23
The Panel considered the possibility that lack of experience would artiﬁcially
dampen consumer demand in Korea. Thus, the Panel suggested that there was po-
tential for future competition.24 As Korean consumers’ familiarity increases, their
perception may change so that they eventually consider products to be ‘like’. This
rests upon a problematic assumption that if consumers do not know about a
product because of a measure in dispute, this in itself could suggest that the
country is not complying with its GATT obligations. Further, the treaty text
focuses on products that are ‘like’ or ‘directly competitive or substitutable’.
21 It stated: ‘In de-emphasizing the role played by quantitative analyses of substitutability, the Panel
followed the guidance provided by the Appellate Body in previous cases. In Korea–Alcoholic Beverages,
the Appellate Body expressly found that a particular degree of competition need not be shown in quanti-
tative terms, and cautioned panels against placing undue reliance on “quantitative analyses of the competi-
tive relationship”, because cross-price elasticity is not “the decisive criterion” in determining whether two
products are directly competitive or substitutable’ (WTO, 2011b, at para. 207).
22 The Panel stated: ‘A determination of the precise extent of the competitive overlap can be compli-
cated by the fact that protectionist government policies can distort the competitive relationship between
products, causing the quantitative extent of the competitive relationship to be understated’ (WTO,
2011b, at para. 10.42).
23WTO (1999a), paras. 120, 124.
24 Ibid., at para. 110.












































The Panel also stated that evidence about consumer preference from a market
with similar characteristics may have some relevance.25 The Appellate Body
agreed, but the dispute settlement bodies offered no criteria with which to estab-
lish if markets were sufﬁciently similar. It may be appropriate to consider such evi-
dence, but what amounts to complex modeling should not be done on a
conceptual basis. This reasoning is necessarily reductionist in the variables it
considers.
Importantly, in these disputes, the concept of potential competition introduced a
bias toward ﬁnding products competitive. Further to this, the Appellate Body also
asserted that only a small degree of substitutability in one segment of the market
can establish competitiveness. Philippines–Distilled Spirits focused on higher tax-
ation rates for largely imported distilled alcoholic beverages as compared to, in par-
ticular, domestically produced alcoholic beverages derived from sugarcane. The
Philippines argued that the majority of Filipino consumers could not purchase dis-
tilled alcohols because of their high prices. Therefore, higher taxes on non-sugar-
cane derived alcohol were not protectionist.
The Appellate Body concluded that there was a small amount of competition
between imported and domestic distilled spirits among the (luxury) market that
had access to both. According to the Appellate Body:
Article III of GATT 1994 does not protect just some instances or most instances,
but rather, it protects all instances of direct competition. It follows that the com-
petitive relationship does not need to occur throughout the whole market for a
panel to ﬁnd that a measure is inconsistent with the second sentence of Article
III. We thus conclude that, even if the Philippine distilled spirits market were seg-
mented, actual direct competition exists within at least a segment of that
market.26
Thus the Appellate Body asserted as a matter of principle that Article III should
be interpreted to mean that there only needed to be competition in a small
market segment for products to be in competition. It then referenced the submit-
ted cross-price elasticity studies to support the ﬁnding that there was a signiﬁ-
cant degree of competitiveness or substitutability between the products, a
dubious conclusion with respect to this evidence (Neven and Trachtman,
2013: 318).27
25 Ibid., at para. 137.
26WTO (2011b), para. 212.
27 They wrote: ‘The intuition behind the Appellate Body’s reasoning is clear…However, the intuition
is not robust… The fact that sales of foreign products have not vanished in the face of such strong discrim-
ination is more consistent with the view that the demand for foreign products is not strongly affected by the
price of the domestic items (that is the products are not close substitutes for one another). Hence, it appears
that the reasoning of the Appellate Body is at best incomplete.’












































Less Favourable Treatment (Article III(4) and TBT Article 2.1) and ‘so as to
afford protection’ (Article III(2))
The Appellate Body has stated repeatedly that it will not rely upon the effect of a
measure, in terms of trade volumes of domestic versus imported products, to estab-
lish discrimination. This is because there may be discriminatory treatment that is
not reﬂected by trade volumes, but exists in the application of the regulation.
According to the Appellate Body in Korea–Alcoholic Beverages: ‘the Panel stated
that if a particular degree of competition had to be shown in quantitative terms,
that would be similar to requiring proof that a tax measure has a particular
impact on trade … We do not consider the Panel’s reasoning on this point to be
ﬂawed.’28 This is because Article III outlines a code of conduct for trade partners.
Regardless of current import levels, a measure should not limit ‘competitive oppor-
tunities’.29 The goal of protecting competitive opportunities has become a de facto
precedent, as afﬁrmed by the Appellate Body in EC–Seal Products.30
There is clearly a tension between, on the one hand, emphasizing detrimental
impact as decisive, and, on the other, focusing on competitive opportunities. Like
‘potential competition’, ‘competitive opportunities’ are difﬁcult or impossible to
measure. Following from this, in a number of disputes, the reasoning seems less
than robust. For example, in US–COOL, a recent TBT dispute, the Appellate
Body agreed with the Panel’s analysis that the measure provided a negative
impact on conditions of competition for imported cattle and stated that the low
market share of imported beef was one component that suggested this detrimental
impact.31 This dispute was unusual for the degree to which it took account of trade
ﬂows in establishing less favourable treatment (Pauwelyn, 2013: 10). The Panel
noted that the measure led to segregation between domestic and imported
animals; while this in itself did not constitute discrimination, segregation led to
higher costs.32 It also concluded that the measure created incentives for participants
to process domestic rather than imported livestock because it would be cheaper to
do so.33 Thus, the measure created a lack of competitive opportunities for imported
livestock, and constituted less favourable treatment.34
28WTO (1999a), para. 130. As summarized in Thailand–Cigarettes (Philippines): ‘The analysis of
whether imported products are accorded less favourable treatment requires a careful examination
“grounded in close scrutiny of the fundamental thrust and effect of the measure itself”, including of the
implications of the measure for the conditions of competition between imported and like domestic pro-
ducts. This analysis need not be based on empirical evidence as to the actual effects of the measure at
issue in the internal market of the Member concerned.’ WTO (2011a), para. 129.
29WTO (2012c), para. 270.
30WTO (2014c)Q5 , para. 5.101.
31WTO (2012c), at para. 291.Q8
32 Ibid., at paras. 7.328, 7.372.
33 Ibid., at para. 7.357.
34 Ibid., at paras. 7.373–74.












































The Panel’s ﬁnding centred on the fact that the technical requirements of the
measure, for example, segregation and increased compliance costs for imported
cattle, created detrimental conditions of competition. However, this ﬁnding left un-
examined whether, in practice, the measure created a situation where domestic beef
was being favoured over imported or mixed-origin beef.35 It is possible, for
example, that even with the regulatory burden of the labeling requirement,
imported beef was still cheaper.
This is important because a preference for domestic beef was one of the assump-
tions upon which the outcome rested.36 As Mavroidis stated: ‘How can the AB
know which beef is being favoured when it has not conducted market analysis?
It seems that the AB came up with one theoretically probable (even plausible)
but unproven scenario (segregation will push traders to US beef) and then built
its ﬁnding on this score around it’ (Mavroidis, 2012: 521)Q9 .
US–Tuna II: a challenging scenario
US–Tuna II is a 2011 TBT dispute which raises complex questions regarding the
use of market analysis, but ultimately highlights the same problems documented
above; namely the need for a more rigorous use of evidence. It concerned a US
law that tuna could not be labeled dolphin safe if it were ﬁshed by encircling dol-
phins with purse seine nets to catch the tuna that congregated underneath, a re-
quirement that applied speciﬁcally within the Eastern Tropical Paciﬁc (‘ETP’).37
The Panel focused its analysis of whether tuna that did and did not qualify for
the label were ‘like’ on the BTA criteria. Based on physical characteristics, end-
uses, and customs classiﬁcation, the products were ‘like’ – indeed, identical.
However, the Panel would not pass judgment on Mexican ﬁshing practices by im-
plying they were unsafe to dolphins. Therefore, the Panel dismissed consumer pref-
erence for one type of tuna over another as irrelevant.
Adopting a more market-based approach, the ﬁrst question is which tuna pro-
ducts to compare. This may seem straightforward: the dispute concerned
Mexican versus US tuna, so the products could be compared on the basis of nation-
ality to conﬁrm what would be expected to be a very high degree of substitutability.
However, most Mexican tuna were caught by setting on dolphins, so would not
have received the US ‘dolphin safe’ label, and this label (the measure in dispute)
may have inﬂuenced the competitiveness of the products.
In this context, the challenge is to try and ascertain consumer views of the
product independent of the regulation. In other words, did consumers speciﬁcally
prefer tuna that were not caught by setting on dolphins, to the extent that the pro-
ducts would not be in competition even if the label were removed or its conditions
35 Ibid., at paras. 7.303–81
36 Ibid., at paras. 348–349.
37WTO (2012b), para 2.15.












































modiﬁed so that Mexican tuna could achieve market access? Indeed, there was evi-
dence that consumer’s preferences on this issue were so strong as to lead industrial
consumers of tuna products to deem tuna caught by setting on dolphins as non-
competitive. The Panel stated:
We further note that it is undisputed that US consumers are sensitive to the
dolphin-safe issue. This is acknowledged by both Mexico and the United
States, and is also conﬁrmed by the evidence presented with the amicus curiae
brief to which the United States has referred to in its answers to questions …
The evidence presented to the Panel also shows that major tuna processors
reacted to these dolphin-safe concerns, and that this led to changes in their pur-
chasing policies as of April 1990. These policies are still in place: such companies
will not purchase tuna from vessels that ﬁsh in association with dolphins.38
The Panel here extrapolated that the dolphin-safe label had a commercial value,
and that producers actually refused to buy uncertiﬁed tuna for fear of consumer
boycotts. It is difﬁcult to reconcile these statements, made in the context of the
‘less favourable treatment’ analysis, with its conclusion that consumer preference
was irrelevant to the competitiveness of these products.
The Panel then went on to examine whether Mexican tuna was subject to less
favourable treatment. It established that only 1% of the imports in the responding
country, the US, came from Mexico, the complaining country. On ﬁrst glance, this
low ﬁgure suggests that the measure is having a negative impact on Mexican
imports. However, the Appellate Body stated:
Moreover, it is well established that WTO rules protect competitive opportun-
ities, not trade ﬂows. [footnote omitted] It follows that, even if Mexican tuna pro-
ducts might not achieve a wide penetration of the US market in the absence of the
measure at issue due to consumer objections to the method of setting on dolphins,
this does not change the fact that it is the measure at issue … that denies most
Mexican tuna products access to a ‘dolphin-safe’ label in the US market.39
The Appellate Body suggested that consumer preferences might be the reason there
were not many imports from Mexico, and there would not be many even if the
measure were removed. In other words, it was very possible that the products
were not competitive (or ‘like’), and that the measure had no negative competitive
impact on Mexican tuna. However, the measure was in violation because it did not
preserve ‘competitive opportunities’. It is hard to say exactly what this means; the
possibility that future consumers might care less about setting on dolphins is one
troubling interpretation.
This regulation poses deeper challenges than the taxation of alcoholic beverages,
due to the difﬁculty of identifying the inﬂuence of the regulation in dispute and the
fact that the submitted evidence did not ﬁt a traditional cross-price elasticity model
38 Ibid., at para. 7.289.
39 Ibid., at para. 239.












































(indeed some came from an amicus curiae brief). Nonetheless, it underlines the
degree of discretion afforded by the BTA criteria and ‘competitive opportunities’
test. It seems feasible to conduct cross-price elasticity analysis of the extent to
which end-of-the-line consumers would consent to ‘setting on dolphins’ given par-
ticular price differentials; such evidence would certainly aid in coming to more
rigorous conclusions regarding the competitive relationships at stake. A legal
culture of relying more on market analysis is an essential component of improving
the quality and quantity of evidence that dispute Parties submit.
Practical considerations for a more quantitative approach
These examples demonstrate how the continued insistence that the National
Treatment Principle is founded in an assessment of competitive relationships
gives a false impression. The core concepts of ‘potential competition’ and ‘competi-
tive opportunities’ are not reﬂected by the treaty text. In practice, assessing these
concepts involves utilizing legal reasoning to undertake complex market analysis,
and in some cases this seems to serve the aim of establishing a violation.
Decoupling quantitative and qualitative reasoning, and tying dispute outcomes
to a more rigorous use of the former, would lead to simpler, more accurate, and
more transparent dispute outcomes.
Given the strength of the above condemnation, it is important to acknowledge
that quantitative analysis of competitive relationships has its limitations, both cap-
acity-related and methodological.
As summarized by Howse and Levy:
Consumer-preference estimates are not always precise. These characterizations
are not universal constants, waiting to be discovered … They emerge from par-
ticular samples in a data set and are based on particular modeling of preferences.
Even then, they emerge with error bands. (Howse and Levy, 2013: 341)
The assessment of whether consumers ﬁnd particular products to be in a competi-
tive relationship is based upon a set of choices made by modelers. There is inevit-
ably room for error (and bias) not only in the sampling process itself but also in the
choice of which population to sample. There are also limitations related to data
capture. Self-selecting participants in surveys on purchasing preferences may not
be representative of the population as a whole. They may report their preferences
inaccurately; for example, they may underestimate the quantity of alcohol they
consume due to societal prohibitions (Sousa, 2014: 12). In sum, as the WTO
itself stated in the World Trade Report of 2005, ‘Elasticity values are not normally
known with precision’ (World Trade Organization, 2005b: 177).
Further, it seems doubtful that any country would provide evidence that did not
serve its own aims, and the respondent will likely generate the majority of the eco-
nomic analysis. Complainants will not have access to the same information about
the domestic situation.












































However, as stated by Howse and Levy, ‘the perfect ought not to be the enemy of
the good’ (Howse and Levy, 2013: 341). The recommendations made here are
based in a slightly different universe, in which Panels are always supplied with sufﬁ-
cient and high-quality evidence from the Parties and WTO Panels have sufﬁcient
economic expertise to evaluate this evidence in a rigorous manner. The current jur-
isprudence effectively advises against relying too much on sophisticated economet-
ric models in this context. If WTO Panels took quantitative evidence more
seriously, this would introduce a motive for Member States to do the same. With
respect to the limitations in the capability of WTO Panels to interpret the evidence,
and the lack of transparency in their approach, persuasive arguments have been
made about the need to incorporate more economic expertise into the WTO
dispute settlement process through appointing Panelists with economic expertise
and providing more specialists in economics to adjudicators (Bown, 2010;
Pauwelyn, 2013).
4. The role of regulatory intent in the National Treatment Principle: evolution of
the controversy
After more rigorously establishing that disputed products are in competition, and
that there is a negative competitive impact on imported products, the Appellate
Body should then turn to the question of whether this impact can be explained
with respect to a non-protectionist regulatory purpose.
The issue has been actively contested since the pre-1995 GATT era. The case law
is evolutionary and at times discrepant. The incorporation of an analysis of regu-
latory rationale under TBT Article 2.1 suggested that the National Treatment
Principle in WTO law as a whole might evolve in this direction. With its clear afﬁr-
mation in EC–Seal Products, the Appellate Body has apparently brought to a close
nearly twenty-ﬁve years of debate on this issue, at least with respect to GATT
Article III(4).
The early debate: aim and effect and the ‘like’ products test
Pre-WTO GATT Panels recognized ‘intent’ and ‘effect’ as key components of
establishing protectionism. In a 1992 GATT dispute under III(2), US–Malt
Beverages,40 the Panel decided that the determination of whether the products in
dispute were ‘like’ should also regard the broader purpose of the Article articulated
in the chapeau: a measure should not be applied so as to afford protection to do-
mestic products. This argument was applied and extended in the unadopted
GATT Panel report in the dispute US–Taxes on Automobiles.41 The Panel con-
cluded that, though a US luxury excise tax on automobiles had a de facto effect
40GATT (1992).
41 GATT (1994).












































of discriminating against imports, the tax did not have a discriminatory intent.42 In
this context, the Panel should examine not only the effect of the measure, but its
aim, a synonym for ‘intent’.
In the early WTO dispute Japan–Alcoholic Beverages II, the Appellate Body
rejected this ‘aim-and-effect’ approach. First, the approach had a clear methodo-
logical failing of integrating the analysis of whether a measure was protectionist
into the ‘like’ products test. Article III(2) makes reference to the chapeau and its
concept of ‘protectionism’ in its second sentence. Second, government intent was
too subjective.43 In Chile–Alcoholic Beverages, the Appellate Body reafﬁrmed
that ‘The subjective intentions inhabiting the minds of individual legislators or reg-
ulators do not bear upon the inquiry, if only because they are not accessible to
treaty interpreters.’44
Since Japan–Alcoholic Beverages II, the Appellate Body has consistently afﬁrmed
that ‘likeness’ is a market-based, not a policy-based, concept. In EC–Asbestos, it
stated that ‘a determination of “likeness” under Article III:4 is, fundamentally, a de-
termination about the nature and extent of a competitive relationship between and
among products’.45 However, in this very dispute, some analyses argued that the
compelling policy justiﬁcation for differentiating a carcinogenic and non-carcino-
genic product weighed more in the decision than whether the products in dispute
were in a competitive relationship (Horn and Weiler, 2003: 31; Lydgate, 2011:
178–180).
‘Less favourable treatment’
The rejection of aim and effect formed the primary focus of Hudec’s noted article
lamenting, the rejection of ‘regulatory purpose’ under the National Treatment
Principle analysis (Hudec, 1998). Yet perhaps now, in the wake of EC–Seal
Product, is the time for a more decisive requiem in the Article III(4) context. The
‘aim and effect’ approach left open the question of whether an examination of
regulatory purpose could be integrated into the rest of the discrimination analysis,
but it has been de-emphasized.
After rejecting ‘aim and effect’ in Japan–Alcoholic Beverages II, the Appellate
Body afﬁrmed that it is necessary under the second sentence of Article III(2) to
examine whether a measure is applied ‘so as to afford protection’ to directly com-
petitive or substitutable domestic products. Rather than being based upon subject-
ive ‘intent’, however, this analysis ‘objectively’ examines the structure and
application of a measure.46
42 Ibid., at paras. 5.24–5.8.
43WTO (1996), at 28–29.Q7
44WTO (1999c), at para. 62.
45 Ibid., at para. 99.
46WTO (1996), at 29.Q7












































The rejection of ‘aim’ in favour of ‘objective’ structure likely shifted the emphasis
away from certain types of ‘subjective’ evidence, such as reviewing preparatory
materials of the legislation, and suggests that any statements regarding the
purpose of the regulation, even within the regulation, are not a valid source of evi-
dence. While the position remains formally consistent, in some Article III(2) dis-
putes,47 the Appellate Body has made reference to just such evidence. Even in
Chile–Alcoholic Beverages,48 after rejecting ‘subjective’ intent, the Appellate
Body afﬁrmed that a measure’s purposes are relevant to whether it is applied so
as to afford protection to domestic products.49 This is also symptomatic of how
the disavowal of ‘subjective’ intent has led to a kind of double consciousness, per-
petuating the Appellate Body’s discomfort with this component of the analysis and
yet maintaining its unavoidable centrality.
If this situation could be described as ambivalent, the Appellate Body’s treatment
of regulatory purpose under Article III(4) is inexplicably dismissive. In the vast ma-
jority of disputes, it has afﬁrmed that a negative impact on conditions of competi-
tion to the detriment of imported products is indicative of a violation. There has
been some inconsistency. In EC–Asbestos, the Appellate Body made reference to
the chapeau’s emphasis on preventing protectionism and developed a two-step ana-
lysis: ﬁrst, establishing whether the ‘like’ products were treated differently; second,
determining whether that differential treatment constituted less favourable
treatment.50
In Dominican Republic–Cigarettes, the Appellate Body further clariﬁed:
However, the existence of a detrimental effect on a given imported product result-
ing from a measure does not necessarily imply that this measure accords less fa-
vourable treatment to imports if the detrimental effect is explained by factors or
circumstances unrelated to the foreign origin of the product [emphasis added].51
Here, a measure with negative impact on conditions of competition may not violate
Article III(4), if that impact is explained by something besides protectionism.
These rulings, coupled with the recent evolution of a line of jurisprudence under
TBT Article 2.1 examining the existence of a ‘legitimate regulatory distinction’, led
the EU, the responding country in EC–Seal Products, to argue that a similar test
should be incorporated under GATT Article III(4).52 The Appellate Body closed
the door on this possibility. It stated:
a determination of whether imported products are treated less favourably than
like domestic products involves an assessment of the implications of the contested
47WTO (1997), at 27–28.Q7
48WTO (1999c), para. 71.
49 Ibid.
50WTO (2001), para. 100.
51WTO (2005a), para. 93
52WTO (2014a), paras. 2.179–2.184.












































measure for the equality of competitive conditions between imported and like do-
mestic products. If the outcome of this assessment is that the measure has a det-
rimental impact on the conditions of competition for like imported products, then
such detrimental impact will amount to treatment that is ‘less favourable’ within
the meaning of Article III:4 [emphasis added].53
The Appellate Body clariﬁed that, in Dominican Republic–Cigarettes, it had not
intended that there be an additional step of considering explicitly whether a detri-
mental impact could be explained by factors unrelated to the foreign origin of the
product.54 However, it stated that in that dispute, ‘the detrimental impact on com-
petitive opportunities for like imported products was not attributable to the
measure at issue’.55 It afﬁrmed that there had to be a ‘genuine relationship’
between the regulation in dispute ‘and its adverse impact on competitive opportun-
ities for imported versus like domestic products’.56 When determining this, the rele-
vant question is whether the regulation in dispute is what affects the conditions
under which the ‘like’ products compete.57
The ‘genuine relationship’: a portal for regulatory purpose?
Previous hopes that the rulings of EC–Asbestos and Dominican Republic–
Cigarettes provided an inroad for regulatory purpose under Article III(4) (Porges
and Trachtman, 2006: 84–86) may migrate to this ‘genuine relationship’ test.
After all, the requirement for a genuine relationship between a measure and its
effects could be interpreted as requiring a negative impact to have a causal link
to a protectionist motive. Yet a close reading reveals this is not the case. The
Appellate Body afﬁrmed that the relevant question is whether the regulation in
dispute is what affects the conditions under which the ‘like’ products compete.
The causal analysis thus serves to establish that it was the measure in dispute
that caused the negative competition impact, and not for example other market
factors.58 A more rigorous standard would be a welcome development, but
cannot stand in for examining whether a detrimental impact could be explained
vis-à-vis a non-protectionist purpose.
Arguments against the disparate impact approach
It makes GATT Article III a deregulatory instrument
53 Ibid., at para. 5.116.
54 Ibid., at para. 5.104.
55 Ibid., at para. 5.105.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid.
58 This is borne out by Dominican Republic–Cigarettes, in which the Appellate Body considered
whether a bond posted to ensure tax payments constituted less favourable treatment of imported cigarettes.
On a per-capita basis, imported cigarettes bore a higher cost. However, the higher cost was attributable to
the small market share, not the fact that they were imported (WTO, 2005a, para. 96).












































The only possible justiﬁcation for differentiating Article III(2) from III(4) is that
the former refers explicitly to the chapeau’s ‘so as to afford protection’. This exces-
sively textual approach misses the forest for the trees. It implies that taxation
measures should be treated less strictly than regulatory measures, when Article
III(1), the chapeau, equally informs the interpretation of all of Article III (Flett,
2013: 57).59
This leads to the more fundamental question of whether protectionism equates
with ‘disparate impact’. There is some evidence that this is a conventional interpret-
ation underWTO law. A 1999 Report from theWTO Secretariat summarized that:
‘The essence of the principle of national treatment is to require that a WTO
Member does not put the goods or services or persons of other WTO Members
at a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis its own goods or services or nationals [em-
phasis added]’.60 This interpretation is oft-reinforced in the disputes, such as the
Appellate Body’s statement in Korea–Alcoholic Beverages that ‘the object and
purpose of Article III is the maintenance of equality of conditions of competition
for imported and domestic products [emphasis added]’.61
However, the treaty text does not support this, and the discrepant approach to
TBT Article 2.1 disputes cast more doubt on the interpretation. Further, in
Japan–Alcoholic Beverages II, the Appellate Body declared that that ‘the broad
and fundamental purpose of Article III is to avoid protectionism in the application
of internal tax and regulatory measures … Toward this end, Article III obliges
Members of the WTO to provide equality of competitive conditions for imported
products in relation to domestic products.’62 Equality of competitive conditions
is a tool toward the end of determining protectionism, not the ﬁnal goal.63 These
discrepant interpretations again capture the double consciousness regarding the in-
terpretation of protectionism.
Also, even if WTOMembers support disparate impact when they initiate nation-
al treatment disputes, it seems unlikely to appeal to them when they are on the re-
ceiving end. As a third party to the EC–Seal Products dispute, the United States
summarized the problem:
It is … difﬁcult to understand how a ‘detrimental impact’ on imports from one
Member compared to another Member can by itself be sufﬁcient to ﬁnd that
those imports are being treated less favorably. One would expect that any
measure will affect some products differently from others. Yet that different
59 Flett (2013) writes: ‘All of Article III is contextually informed by the principle in Article III:I that
measures are not to be applied so as to afford protection to domestic production, which is commonly
cited as the legal basis for the concept of de facto breaches.’
60WTO (1999b), p. 4.
61WTO (1999a), para. 127.
62WTO (1996), p. 16.
63 The Appellate Body cited this statement in Korea–Alcoholic Beverages, WTO (1999a), para. 119,
and EC–Asbestos, WTO (2001), para. 97.












































treatment would not amount to discrimination unless one also looks at the reason
why there was such a difference in treatment.64
The EU made similar arguments in its submission.65
If taken at face value, this ruling will lead to spurious ﬁndings of violation. Under
WTO law, Member States have an ‘undisputed’ right to ‘set the level of protection
they wish to achieve’.66 They are free to pursue regulatory goals, even if this is detri-
mental to imported products. AsVerhoosel has argued, if everymeasurewith a dispar-
ate impact automatically violates the National Treatment Principle, it becomes an
instrument of deregulation rather than non-discrimination (Verhoosel, 2002: 48).67
Article XX is not sufﬁcient to capture the ‘policy-based’ component of the
non-discrimination analysis
A measure found to violate Article III may be saved by the General Exception,
Article XX, if it falls under its subparagraphs, which delimit particular public
policy goals such as public morals, human, animal, and plant life and health, pre-
vention of deceptive practices, and protection of exhaustible natural resources,
inter alia.68 In the language of the Article XX chapeau, the measure cannot be
‘applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustiﬁable
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised
restriction on international trade’.69
Article XX forms an important component of enabling governments to regulate
in the public interest. Yet under a disparate impact approach, Article XX becomes
the only provision to consider whether a trade-restrictive regulation has a non-pro-
tectionism motive. This makes an exception to the GATT necessary to the complete
application of one of its articles. Article XX covers a ﬁnite list of exceptions; regu-
lations not covered may also have a non-discriminatory motive. Also, not all regu-
latory goals are clearly identiﬁed under Article XX. One example is trade-restrictive
regulation that protects products with particular cultural value. Cultural value is
recognized only very narrowly under the list of exceptions (Burri-Nenova, 2009).
In practice, of course, if the Appellate Body is ‘stricter’ with Article III, it can
apply Article XX ‘generously’. Even so, this approach seems artiﬁcial.
Disparate impact ‘imbalances’ TBT Article 2.1 vis-à-vis GATT Article III(4)
The outcome of EC–Seal Products has formalized a disparity between Article III
and TBT Article 2.1. Under both TBT Article 2.1 and GATT Article III(4), the
64WTO (2014b).
65WTO (2014a), para. 2.181.
66WTO (2001), para. 168.
67 See also GATT (1994), para. 5.24.
68 Article XX, GATT 1994.
69 Ibid.












































Appellate Body ﬁrst establishes a disparate impact. The TBT Agreement contains
an additional step, under which the Appellate Body considers whether a disparate
impact is explained by a ‘legitimate regulatory distinction’. To determine whether a
regulatory distinction is legitimate, it takes into account whether a measure has
been applied in an even-handed manner to foreign and domestic ‘like’ products
by examining the design, architecture, and revealing structure of the measure.
These elements parallel the ‘protective application’ test under Article III(2). This
test differs, however, by additionally considering whether there is a rational rela-
tionship between the measure in dispute and the regulatory goal.70
The TBT rulings offered a promise of an evolutionary interpretation of the
National Treatment Principle more broadly. Responding to the rulings, for
example, Flett wrote: ‘In the most recent cases the tail (the TBT Agreement) has
wagged the dog (the GATT 1994), re-afﬁrming the regulatory space in Article
III:4 and, by extension, Article III:2, and heralding a further improvement in the
previously unsettled balance between the trade interest and national regulatory au-
tonomy’ (Flett, 2013: 39).
Instead of consolidating this improvement, the Appellate Body deepened the
divide between Article III(4) and TBT Article 2.1, in the process afﬁrming its differ-
ence from Article III(2)). Differences in the ‘context, object and purpose’ of the TBT
Agreement justiﬁed this differing approach.71 Primarily, this difference was the
availability of Article XX under the GATT Agreement but not the TBT
Agreement. The Appellate Body stated:
In our view, the fact that, under the GATT 1994, a Member’s right to regulate is
accommodated under Article XX, weighs heavily against an interpretation of
Articles I:1 and III:4 that requires an examination of whether the detrimental
impact of a measure on competitive opportunities for like imported products
stems exclusively from a legitimate regulatory distinction. In the light of the im-
mediate contextual differences between the TBT Agreement and the GATT
1994, we do not consider that the legal standard for the non-discrimination ob-
ligation under Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement applies equally to claims under
Articles I:1 and III:4 of the GATT 1994.72
In fact, neither the existence of Article XX nor the contextual differences between
the agreements justify the divergence. The TBT Agreement contains a component
similar to GATT Article XX, Article 2.2, though it does not contain a closed list
of speciﬁc negotiated exceptions, but covers any ‘legitimate objective’. If a
measure complies with Article XX, it complies with the GATT. Conversely, if
measure complies with TBT 2.2, it can still violate TBT 2.1 and therefore the
TBT Agreement as a whole. In this sense, the TBT test is more intrusive into
70WTO (2011a), paras. 92–103.
71 Ibid., at paras. 92–103.
72WTO (2014a), para. 5.125.












































domestic regulation, justifying a less strict approach to TBT Article 2.1 (Howse and
Levy, 2013: 350; Ming Du, 2007).
In practice, however, the ruling has made Article III(4) a more difﬁcult test to
pass. The EU argued that creating a divergent test would ‘“render Article 2.1 of
the TBT Agreement irrelevant” as complainants would have a strong incentive
not to invoke Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement, and, instead, to bring claims
under the GATT 1994, even if the measure at issue qualiﬁed as a technical regula-
tion’.73 In EC–Seal Products, Norway made its complaint against the EU only
under GATT Article III, and not under TBT Article 2.1. Clearly, Norway perceived
GATT Article III as being tougher. The difference in interpretation has the likely
result that complaining countries will follow Norway in focusing their complaints
on the GATT Agreement.
This was also noted by the US following the dispute:
we are not fully persuaded by the Appellate Body’s ﬁnding that the national treat-
ment provisions of the TBT Agreement are to be interpreted differently from the
national treatment provisions of the GATT 1994 in light of the fact that these two
provisions contain identical wording….. Indeed, these ﬁndings raise the very real
possibility, as demonstrated in this dispute, that Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement
will become superﬂuous, and the legal approach developed in the recent TBT dis-
putes will become just an historical footnote.74
The primary contextual difference between the provisions is that TBT Article 2.1
deals exclusively with technical regulations. The deﬁnition of technical contains
several components,75 but with respect to the importance of considering the regu-
latory rationale, there does not seem to be any clear reason to differentiate the legal
approach.
As summarized by Davey and Maskus,
Of course, the justiﬁcation is that the context of TBT Article 2.1 requires this
result, but it is hard to see why the context of Article III(4) – and speciﬁcally
the context supplied by Article 3.1 – should not also require such a result …
[The Appellate Body’s divergent] approach in [the TBT dispute] US–Clove
Cigarettes…highlights the problems with the way it has largely read the less fa-
vourable treatment requirement out of Article III:4. (Davey and Maskus, 2013:
180–181)
The TBT Agreement was negotiated approximately ﬁfty years after the GATT
Agreement and its Article III to build upon past experience and create a more spe-
cialized legal instrument. While there have been only a handful of disputes under
this provision, becoming an ‘historical footnote’ would be an unfortunate
outcome for this valuable jurisprudence.
73 Ibid., at para. 2.183.
74WTO (2014b).
75WTO (2001), paras. 66–70.












































How to incorporate regulatory rationale into Article III(4)
This article has argued for greater convergence between Article III(2) and III(4) and
TBT Article 2.1, and that examining ‘aim’, or regulatory intent, should be a part of
the test of protectionism under all three. One important question is the depth of the
reforms necessary to create this convergence. Verhoosel proposed the deep reform
of replacing both Article III/XX and TBT Article 2.1/2.2 with integrated tests that
incorporate the same fundamental stages (Verhoosel, 2002). This elegant solution
would reduce the complexity that arises from separating these components. In def-
erence to the practical difﬁculties of treaty amendment, the reforms proposed here
are more moderate: maintaining the existing provisions and trying to work around
problems of replication. These reforms depart from existing case law, but there is
no bar to this departure. Existing case law clearly plays an important role in
shaping Appellate Body decisions, and yet, unlike common law systems, the
Appellate Body is not bound by its own precedents. In fact, this very article docu-
ments how the case law on regulatory purpose has evolved over time.
A relatively simple means for reforming Article III(4) is to bring it in line with
Article III(2), so that it incorporates the same test of protective application. This
would go a signiﬁcant distance toward rectifying the current imbalance, but
there would still be a gap between Article III(4) and TBT Article 2.1, as under
the latter the Appellate Body additionally considers whether the policy objective
at stake rationally accounts for the difference in treatment between ‘like’ domestic
and imported products. One complication to utilizing the TBT Article 2.1 approach
under Article III(4) is that the discrimination analysis under the Article XX chapeau
contains this same test.76 Though there are some differences,77 this stage of the ana-
lysis would effectively be replicated in Article III(4) disputes in which the regulating
country invoked Article XX.
One solution is to incorporate what might be termed a ‘negative’ approach,
rather than a ‘positive’ one. A negative approach would examine whether any
factors unrelated to the origin of the product explained the difference in treatment.
This would be similar to the ‘genuine relationship’ test, but focus on establishing a
policy-based rather than market-based causal link. Considering any potential ex-
planation differs from the positive approach taken under TBT Article 2.1, which
focuses on the speciﬁc policy justiﬁcation put forth by the regulating country.
Pragmatically speaking, a positive approach is likely less cumbersome, and
avoids an open-ended process of elimination of what other objectives the regulation
in dispute might pursue. Nonetheless, embracing this negative approach would
have the beneﬁt of incorporating an analysis of regulatory rationale without repli-
cating the chapeau test.
76WTO (2014a), paras. 5.310–5.314.
77 Ibid.; also see WTO (2015), paras. 7.555–7.560.












































Incidentally, there is the possibility that regulation discriminates against
imported products as the result of lack of foresight or poor drafting. In this scen-
ario, neither a protectionist nor a ‘legitimate’ aim would account for the disparate
impact. The reason to examine the intent of a measure is to enable an appropriate
amount of regulatory space for legitimate policy goals, so if there is what might be
termed accidental protectionism, this should indeed fall foul of WTO rules.
An explicit and consistent consideration of regulatory purpose, following any of
the approaches proposed above, enables an expanded use of evidence. There
should be no bar to examining statements of intent in the wording of the legislation
itself, or its preparatory documents. Such evidence can enhance a rigorous examin-
ation of whether a measure is protectionist.
Any feasible reform proposal must of course also consider why the Appellate
Body has taken such a cautious and circumspect approach. There are political difﬁ-
culties involved with empowering an international judiciary to determine the
purpose of domestic regulation. These proposed reforms may appear to give
carte blanche to the Appellate Body, empowering it with judicial authority that
goes beyond its limited competencies. This argument rests in the assumption that
eliminating a consistent and explicit consideration of regulatory purpose will
somehow prevent the Appellate Body from undermining national regulatory
autonomy.
This is false. Under TBT Article 2.1, the Appellate Body undertakes precisely this
type of analysis when evaluating the legitimacy of the regulatory objective against
an open-ended list of objectives, without such ill effect. Indeed, these disputes
provide a model for how such an analysis can take place. Also, as argued above,
the Appellate Body is already taking regulatory intent into account when adjudicat-
ing Article III disputes. By denying that this is a factor in its decisions, it has made its
reasoning on this point less rigorous and more implicit. Thus, acknowledging this
as a formal step of the analysis will actually hold the Appellate Body more to
account in its evaluation of domestic regulatory priorities.
Discerning the existence of protectionism by its very nature necessitates a sophis-
ticated act of judgment, as there is often an elusive relationship between the stated
and ‘real’ purpose of regulation in dispute. Beyond including it as a formal stage of
the analysis, it is not possible to prescribe a precise formula for a ﬁnding of protect-
ive intent. The same type of evidence may lead to opposite conclusions in different
disputes. To take the example of preparatory statements for the legislation, while
these should be taken into account they cannot be determinative. False negatives
could occur if there were no statement of protectionist intent and the Appellate
Body concluded that regulation was therefore not protectionist despite clear evi-
dence to the contrary. False positives might also occur if a politician portrayed
non-protectionist regulation as protectionist in order to gain support from
certain constituencies. Instead, a combination of intent- and effect-based evidence
must inform the analysis on a case-by-case basis. Despite the political difﬁculties












































involved in the Appellate Body determining the purpose of Member States’ regula-
tion, there is no avoiding the fact that the judges must judge.
7. Conclusion
Under the current approach to the National Treatment Principle, various compo-
nents of the protectionism analysis are conﬂated. The Appellate Body has
afﬁrmed that assessing the competitiveness of products in dispute, and existence
of a detrimental competitive impact imports, restsQ11 on market analysis. In practice,
however, it has been circumspect in utilizing submitted quantitative evidence, and
relied on qualitative concepts of potential competition and competitive opportun-
ities. These interpretive strategies, not reﬂected in the treaty text, give rise at times
to a false impression that qualitative conclusions are based on quantitative evi-
dence, leading to a lack of transparency. Furthermore, they are speculative and
sometimes questionable with respect to the evidence submitted.
There is a similar conﬂation, both explicit and implicit, between market-based
and policy-based elements of the analysis. Following from EC–Seal Products,
under Article III(4), the latter has simply been denied. As considering the policy
intent of a regulation is an unavoidable part of the reasoning, this leads to a situ-
ation where it can only be incorporated implicitly. For example, the Appellate
Body might defer to a compelling policy-based justiﬁcation by deciding that a
wide market segment of ‘like’ imported products has to be subject to a detrimental
competitive impact (making violation more difﬁcult to establish), or conclude that
there has to be a large degree of detrimental impact.
This article advocates a return to the clarity of separate analysis of market-based
‘effect’ and policy-based ‘intent’ under the National Treatment Principle in TBT
Article 2.1 and GATT Article III. Both should contain the same fundamental
tests: considering whether products in dispute are in a competitive relationship
and whether there is a detrimental impact on competition for imports, then
whether this impact can be explained vis-à-vis a non-protectionist regulatory
purpose. More convergence will reduce unnecessary complexity and rectify the
current marginalization of the TBT Agreement, and the analyses can still take
account of the differences between the provisions (for example, the relationship
between GATT Article III and Article XX) in ways that are proposed above.
Establishing the existence and nature of competitive relationships based on
market evidence will lead to more rigour and transparency. A politically unpalat-
able outcome will be offset by the subsequent step which enables a compelling regu-
latory rationale to play a role in the analysis. This will eliminate the need to
acknowledge policy-based factors through market-based reasoning. It is even-
handed in its approach to all policy objectives that a government may wish to
pursue, rather than relying on implicit hierarchies of regulatory importance, or
the policy objective falling under a delimited list of ‘exceptions’ under Article XX.












































The National Treatment Principle, and the balance it strikes between national
sovereignty and WTO obligations, is one of the most sensitive issues in WTO
law. As the above-documented disputes demonstrate, in some cases moving
away from an evidence-based approach and relying upon more speculative
methods to establish disparate impact has been used to extend the jurisdiction of
the National Treatment Principle. Denying the role of regulatory intent in the pro-
tectionism analysis under Article III(4) has the same impact, as detrimental com-
petitive impact on imports is not enough of a basis for ﬁndings of non-
compliance. The result in both cases is an imbalance toward trade liberalization
at the expense of domestic regulatory autonomy.
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